Edith Cowan University

Research Online
ECU Publications Pre. 2011
2008

Analysis of Information Remaining on Hand Held Devices for Sale
on the Second Hand Market
Andrew Jones
Edith Cowan University

Craig Valli
Edith Cowan University

Iain Sutherland

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks
Part of the Digital Communications and Networking Commons
10.15394/jdfsl.2008.1041
Jones, A. , Valli, C. , & Sutherland, I. (2008). Analysis of Information Remaining on Hand Held Devices for Sale on
the Second Hand Market. Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 3(2), 55-70. Available here
This Journal Article is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworks/1148

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 3(2)

Analysis of Information Remaining on Hand Held
Devices Offered for Sale on the Second Hand
Market
Dr. Andy Jones1,2
Dr. Craig Valli2
Dr. Iain Sutherland3
1

Information Technology Futures Research Centre, BT
2
Edith Cowan University
3
University of Glamorgan
andrew.28.jones@bt.com
Phone: +44 1473 646133
Fax: +44 1473 644385
ABSTRACT

The ownership and use of mobile phones, Personal Digital Assistants and other
hand held devices is now ubiquitous both for home and business use. The
majority of these devices have a high initial cost, a relatively short period
before they become obsolescent and a relatively low second hand value. As a
result of this, when the devices are replaced, there are indications that they tend
to be discarded. As technology has continued to develop, it has led to an
increasing diversity in the number and type of devices that are available, and
the processing power and the storage capacity of the digital storage in the
device. All organisations, whether in the public or private sector increasingly
use hand held devices that contain digital media for the storage of information
relating to their business, their employees or their customers. Similarly,
individual private users increasingly use hand held devices containing digital
media for the storage of information relating to their private lives.
The research revealed that a significant number of organisations and private
users are ignorant or misinformed about the volume and type of information
that is stored on the hand held devices and the media on which it is stored. It is
apparent that they have either not considered, or are unaware of, the potential
impact of this information becoming available to their competitors or those
with criminal intent.
This main purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of the volume
and type of information that may remain on hand held devices that are offered
for sale on the second hand market. A second aim of the research was to
determine the level of damage that could, potentially be caused, if the
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information that remains on the devices fell into the wrong hands. The study
examined a number of hand held devices that had been obtained from sources
in the UK and Australia that ranged from internet auction sites, to private sales
and commercial resellers.
The study was carried out by the security research team at the BT IT Futures
Centre in conjunction with Edith Cowan University in Australia and the
University of Glamorgan in the UK. The basis of the research was to acquire a
number of second hand hand held devices from a diverse range of sources and
then determine whether they still contained information relating to a previous
owner or whether the information had been effectively removed. The devices
that were obtained for the research were supplied blind to the researchers
through a third party. The ‘blind’ supply of the devices meant that the people
undertaking the research were provided with no information about the device
and that the source of the devices and any external markings were hidden from
them. This process was put in place to ensure that any findings of the research
were based solely on the information that could be recovered from the digital
storage media that was contained within the device.
The underlying methodology that was used in the research was based on the
forensic imaging of the devices. A forensic image of a device is a copy of the
digital media that has been created in a scientifically sound manner to a
standard that is acceptable to the courts. This procedure was implemented to
ensure that the evidential integrity of the devices was maintained, with the
devices also then being stored in a secure manner. All subsequent research
was then conducted on the image of the device. This was considered to be a
sensible precaution against the possibility that information discovered on a
device might indicate criminal activity and require the involvement of law
enforcement. Following the forensic imaging of the devices, the images that
were created were then analysed to determine whether any information
remained and whether it could be easily recovered using commonly available
tools and techniques that anyone who had purchased the device could acquire.
Keywords: Digital forensics, analysis, data recovery, data disposal, electronic
data destruction, privacy.
1. INTRODUCTION
In each of the last three years, studies have been carried out into the level and
type of information that remains on computer hard disks have been offered for
sale on the second hand market [1,2,3]. The results of this research revealed
that significant volumes of information remained on them and with the
increased use of hand held devices and the processing and storage capabilities,
it was logical to examine whether information was also left on the digital
storage media of these devices and if so, the nature of the information that
could be recovered.
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There has been a significant level of reporting in the newspapers [4,5,6,7] on
the level of information that has been lost as a result of errors, accidents and
thefts and of the potential problems and costs to the individual of identity theft.
The UK government is expending considerable resources on schemes such as
Warning, Advice and Reporting Point (WARP) [8] and IT Security Awareness
For Everyone (ITsafe) [9], both of which are aimed at improving information
security and security awareness
There are numerous tools available to enable the effective removal of data from
computer hard disks and it can be suggested that any data remaining on them
can be attributed to poor information security policies, errors or ignorance.
However, the situation with regard to hand held devices is significantly more
complex.
2. HAND HELD DEVICES
For the purpose of this paper, the term hand held device is used to describe
mobile (Cellular) phones, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and Blackberry
(RIM) devices. All three types of device will be discussed, however, in this
research, only mobile phones and Blackberry devices were examined. While
mobile phones are referred to as a generic group, the group is actually made up
of devices that are from four separate groups. These are:
First Generation. The first commercially available mobile phones, these
systems used analogue radio signals to transmit information. These were
bulky devices, characterised by large batteries that were required because
of the high power consumption required for analogue transmission.
Second Generation - Global System for Mobile communications
(GSM) (2G). This was the next development in mobile telephony and
transitioned to the use of digital signals, as these required less battery
power and as a result, allowed for an increase in the talk time available and
for smaller batteries. A secondary advantage of the use of digital signals
was that it provided clearer signals. The 2G mobile phone was very good at
transmitting voice calls, but had limited capability for transmitting or
receiving data. The system uses a system known as CSD (Circuit Switched
Data) to transfer data. CSD requires the phone to make a special
connection to the network before it can transfer data, in a manner similar to
that for making a voice call. Once connected, the user is billed for the time
it takes to send the data and the transfer rate is relatively slow: 14.4 kbps
(kilobits per second) for GSM 1800 networks (Orange and T-Mobile) and
9.6 kbps for GSM 900 networks (Vodafone and O2).
Second Generation Plus (2.5G). A development used to increase the
flexibility of the 2G technology, with enhanced features comparable with
those found on third generation (3G) phones, such as data transfer, GPRS
(General Packet Radio Service) radio and EDGE (Enhanced Data rates for
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GSM Evolution) capabilities.
Third Generation (3G). This is the new network providing greater
efficiency than the 2G standard and allow for much greater data transfer
speeds, typically, in the range of 5-10 Mb per second. This innovation
allows for data such as video clips and music tracks to be downloaded.
Services that are available through 3G include wide-area wireless voice
telephony and broadband wireless data, all in a mobile environment.
The Research In Motion (RIM) Blackberry device is wireless hand held
device that supports both voice and data communications. The device
supports a range of services that includes mobile telephony, text
messaging, web browsing, push e-mail and internet faxing. The device is
one example of a convergent device, which together with the data services
detailed above, is also capable of what are typically considered to be
Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) type applications such as address book,
calendar, to-do lists, etc. Some of these devices are not dependent on
mobile phone service coverage and are capable of using the Wi-Fi system
to connect to a network if required.
This paper assesses the information available on 1G and 2G devices as no 2.5
or 3G phones were easily available on the second hand market at the time that
the devices were acquired.
3. THE DISPOSAL OF HAND HELD DEVICES
The relatively short life cycle of a mobile phone (as little as 12 months for a
privately owned phone and approximately 24 months for a corporately owned
device) means that there are a large number of used devices that are considered
to be ‘obsolete’ and they may still contain relatively recent information at the
point of disposal. Modern hand held devices contain some form of storage
media, usually built into the device and possibly supplemented in the form of a
removable memory card. In the latter case, these may have a significant
capacity, as they are increasingly used for the storage of digital images, often
from a built-in camera, music tracks and other files. Devices that have either an
inbuilt capacity or are capable of supporting external memory storage devices
of between one and eight gigabytes are not uncommon.
The disposal of obsolete hand held devices does not appear to be a subject that
some organisations have given a great deal of consideration to in the past [10] .
The situation is made more complex as most of the devices are provided by a
supplier as part of the mobile communications service and the devices are not
generally considered to have any intrinsic value to the organisation. When they
reach the end of their effective life, in most cases somewhere between one and
two years, they have little or no residual value and do not appear to be given
any consideration with regard to the data that they may still contain.
Many large organisations currently dispose of obsolete mobile phones by
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donating them to charities, which the charities then use them to generate
revenue. It was discovered during the course of the research that a number of
the organisations that the charities sell the mobile devices to have two main
markets for the devices. The resellers identify their main markets as export to
China and Nigeria, which are both regarded as areas posing a high threat to the
security of information.
In addition, whereas the process for the disposal of computers is normally
covered by the information security policies and procedures of the
organisation, mobile phones, to date, have not normally been addressed. With
the disposal of computer equipment, the removal of residual data can be
addressed by the use of processes and procedures for the cleansing of the
media using available tools. In the case of hand held devices, the problem is
significantly more complex. The types of media that are used in mobile
devices and the range of operating systems are considerably more diverse, for
example Symbian, Widows Mobile, Linux. In addition, while computer hard
disks have a limited number of standardised power and data interfaces, hand
held devices have a huge range of both type of interface and they are changed
by the manufacturers at regular intervals.
When a hand held device is sent for disposal, it is unusual for either the power
or the data connector cables to be sent with it. As a result, any attempt to
examine the device and securely remove data will only be possible from a
centre that is well equipped and has the data and power connectors and the
relevant software available. As a result, for a device with no residual intrinsic
value, the likelihood of data cleansing taking place is low.
Organisations either have to adopt policies and procedure to clean and dispose
of obsolete devices through their internal resources or obtain the services of a
third party that would dispose of the devices on their behalf. If an organisation
uses the option of employing a third party to undertake the data erasure from a
hand held device, it is important that they also, periodically check that the
procedures employed by that third party are adequate to remove the data to a
standard that is acceptable to the device owners. If not, there is a likelihood
that the hand held devices will sold on and be re-circulated in the public
domain with some or all of the data present on the device and that it will be
available to anyone using the manufacturer supplied backup and
synchronisation tools. The final option for the safe disposal of the devices,
which is the least satisfactory from a recycling or green perspective, is to
destroy them, either through incineration or mechanical destruction. This has
the issues of depriving the charities of potential income and also of not
recycling equipment that is still of use, both of which will become increasingly
unpopular in the future where it is increasingly seen as unacceptable for
electronic devices, as indicated in the EU directive on Waste Electrical and
Electronic Equipment (EU 2002/95EC).
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For the individual, private device user, the options are similar. The choices are
to either remove the data themselves, using the advice and information that is
available (from a limited number of websites such as Wireless Recycler [11],
or to find an organisation that they feel that they can trust to remove the data
before they recycle the devices.
4. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT DISPOSAL PRACTICES
The research was undertaken to determine the type and volume of information
that could be retrieved from hand held devices that were for sale on the second
hand market. The results were based on the examination of 161 hand held
devices that were supplied blind (the researchers had no foreknowledge of
where the hand held devices had been obtained) to the research for the
experiment. When the research was completed, the third party then supplied
the researchers with the list of the sources from which the hand held devices
had been purchased. The sources of the hand held devices included an on-line
auction site, commercial organisations involved in the supply of second hand
hand held devices and public auctions.
The devices that were supplied to the researchers were identified with a single
sequential serial number. In order to maintain the integrity of the devices, in
case they were required for further research, they were then forensically
imaged and the subsequent analysis was carried out on the images. Tools, such
as Paraben Device Seizure, XRY and the Susteen DataPilot Mobile Phone
Forensic toolkit software were used for the imaging of the devices. The tools
that were used for the analysis were the manufacturer’s desktop interface and
management software and hex editors, tools that any competent computer user
would have access to and be able to use.
Of the 161 hand held devices used in the research, 82 could not be imaged as
they were found to either have been physically damaged, had power problems
as a result of batteries that were missing or had failed or were inaccessible as
the data or power connectors could not be obtained. This research did not
attempt to use more sophisticated tools or techniques as the research was aimed
at identifying what information would be available to a reasonably competent
and knowledgeable user with standard equipment and facilities. The 79 images
created from the devices that could be accessed were used for the analysis. A
number of specialised tools were used by the researchers, but to ensure forensic
soundness and repeatability of the processes so that in the event of information
being found that was related to criminal activity, any evidence was not
contaminated.
The analysis of the hand held devices was carried out in a number of stages.
The first was to determine whether or not the hand held device had any data
that could be seen during an initial examination. This involved the simple step
of loading the image of the hand held device and looking to see if there was
any data present in the predetermined fields. Of the 79 hand held devices for
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which images were successfully made, 36 were found to have data present. In
three of the devices the SIM cards were still present. This was a cursory
examination of the image to determine whether there was easily recoverable
data present on the device that did not require the use of further tools or
techniques. Further investigations were then undertaken into each of these hand
held devices.
The second part of the analysis was to look for specific information that would
allow for the identification of the user and their parent organisation. The
device was also examined for further information such as the usernames, email
addresses or documents, spreadsheets and databases. The purpose of this phase
of the research was to determine the proportion of the devices that could be
traced to an individual and also to the organisation.
The results of the research were that, of the 135 mobile phones that were
examined the following was revealed:
Inaccessible due to device broken, battery not charging or no suitable
connector cable: (82) 61% of the mobile phones were damaged, had
batteries missing that could not be replaced or data connection cables could
not be acquired for them. A number of the phones were extremely old 1G
devices and power supply leads, batteries and data leads are no longer
readily available.
Blank: (27) 20% of the mobile phones contained no data that could be
recovered using standard tools.
SIM Present (3) 2% of the mobile phones still contained the SIM that the
previous user had used.
Identifiable to a user: (10) 7% of the mobile phones contained sufficient
information to be able to identify the user of the device (phone number,
address, user name).
Identifiable to organisation: (12) 9% of the mobile phones contained
sufficient information for the organisations to be identified.
Personal Information: (10) 7% of the mobile phones contained information
from which individuals could be identified. This information included
SMS messages, greetings logos, address book entries and call histories.
Table 1 shows a comparison of the results for the mobile (cell) phones.
It became clear that while there is the potential for a level of data leakage from
1G and 2G mobile phones, it is limited. Information such as address
books/contact lists might be lost as well as a number of SMS messages, but the
loss of a significant volume of sensitive information is unlikely. Although no
2.5 or 3G phones were included in the research, it is thought that the potential
for the loss of sensitive information will increase as the use of these devices
becomes more widespread.
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Table 1: Results from analysis of mobile (cell) phones.

Mobile (Cell) Phones
Personal Information
Identifiable to Organisation
Identifiable to use
SIM present
Blank - no data present
Not Accessible
0

20

40

60

80

100

The results of the research were that, of the 26 Blackberry devices that were
examined the following was revealed:
Not working: (0) 0%. All of the devices were in working order.
Inaccessible due to device being encrypted: (7) 27%. While this figure
seems to be low, it was apparent from the analysis that a significant
number of the other devices that were examined has been cleared of data
and reset. These devices had the common feature of 3 default messages
being held on the system, one from the service provider and two from
Blackberry. It was not possible to determine whether these devices had
been encrypted before they were reset.
Blank: (10) 38% of the Blackberry devices contained either no data or only
the default messages that are sent to all systems of this type.
Identifiable to a user: (4) 16% of the Blackberry devices contained
identifiable usernames.
Identifiable to organisation: (7) 27% of the Blackberry devices contained
sufficient information from which the organisations could be identified.
Comment: In a number of cases, this was actually not a shortcoming in the
measures and procedures that had been implemented. When the devices
were turned on, a number of them had been set up to display the ownership
information on the first screen, a measure that has been adopted by some of
the organisations to enable the recovery of the device if it is lost or
misplaced.
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Personal Information: (4) 16% of the Blackberry devices contained
information from which individuals could be identified.
Table 2 shows a comparison of the results for the Blackberry (RIM) devices.
Table 2: Results from analysis of the Blackberry (RIM) devices
Blackberry (RIM) Devices
Encrypted
Personal Information
Identifiable to Organisation
Identifiable to use
Blank - no data present
0

2

4

6

8

10

12

The level and types of information that was found on the hand held devices and
the range of information that was available resulted in the individual owner and
the organisation that they belonged to being easily identifiable in many cases.
It became very clear at an early stage in the research that RIM Blackberry
devices that had not been encrypted created a huge potential information
leakage threat to both the individual and the organisation.
In one example, a device was examined that had been used by the sales director
for Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) of a major Japanese
corporation. It was possible to recover the call history, the address book, the
diary and the messages from the device and the information that was contained
in these provided:


Information that enabled the structure of the organisation and
responsibilities of individuals to be determined.



The business plans of the organisation for the next period



The identification of the main customers and the state of the
relationships with them to be determined



The travel and accommodation arrangements of the individual



The relationship of the individual with their support staff
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Details of the personal life of the individual including family details
including children and their occupations and movements, marital
status, address, appointments and addresses for dental and medical
care, domestic arrangements and dining and sporting activities.



Bank account numbers and bank sorting code



Car registration index

From this one device, it was possible to recover 249 address book entries, 90
email addresses and 291 emails.
A second Blackberry device had originally belonged to an employee of a
financial sector company; a superannuation organisation. The device contained
emails related to the farming community, a medical appointment, meetings,
bereavement, performance reviews and also contained 19 names and addresses
and call history.
A third Blackberry device belonged to an employee of another financial sector
company, a superannuation organisation. The device contained emails related
to the owner’s identity and a change of their name, details of board meetings,
meeting accommodation details, applications for the post of office manager,
and comments on the suitability of the named and identified applicants and
flight details.
While the last two of the devices detailed above did not contain a significant
volume of information, they both originated in the financial sector and both
contained details of a personal nature of the owner and other individuals that
would have caused embarrassment or distress if it had become publicly known.
The implications of the information on these devices becoming available to
individuals who might make use of it for a range of illicit activities could
potentially, have devastating consequences for an organisation or an individual.
The potential cost of these data losses, both in financial terms and to the
reputation of the organisation or the individual, could be high and it is clear
that additional effort needs to be expended to ensure that this information is
protected.
The loss or disposal of hand held devices that still contain significant amounts
of information is not a new problem. In the year 2005-06 it was reported [12]
that around 800 thousand mobile phones were stolen in the UK. A separate
report from the insurance industry [13] covering the same period indicated that
the number of phones stolen in the UK was closer to 1.3 Million and that the
number reported lost was in the region of 1.6 Million.
5. POTENTIAL IMPACT
The potential implications for both the organisation and the individual of the
information contained on the hand held devices being made available through
either a lack of policy for the secure disposal of such devices within
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organisations or a breakdown in security of the procedures for their disposal
are significant. The most noteworthy ways in which such sensitive information
might be exploited for are discussed below.
Industrial Espionage. For all of the hand held devices that could be identified
as having originated in a commercial organisations, the potential cost of the
information leakage is high. This is exemplified by the information recovered
from the Blackberry device that had belonged to the employee of the Japanese
company that contained information of business plans, staff and competitors,
all of which would be of use to a competitor and the release of which is a
potential embarrassment to the company.
Identity Theft. For the hand held devices that could be identified as having
originated in an organisation or from an individual, there were a number that
contained sufficient information to make it possible to carry out either identity
theft or cloning. The type and volume of personal information varied, but in
the majority of cases included names, addresses, telephone number and email
addresses, together with contact lists, diaries and SMS and email texts.
Research that has been conducted in the USA gives estimates of the number of
people that have suffered some form of identity theft as high as 10 Million
people and the cost to business and consumers at approximately $53 Billion in
the USA alone [14]. The same research estimated that the cost of ‘repairing’ an
individual’s identity was approximately $808 for each incident and around 175
hours of effort. It is estimated that the average monetary loss as a result of an
identity theft is $31,356. A report produced by the Cabinet Office on data
from 2002 in the UK puts the cost of identity theft at £1.3 Billion [15] and
estimated that, in the UK, an identity will be stolen roughly every four minutes.
The figures relating to the cost were updated in 2006 and the new estimate was
£1.72 Billion [16]
Fraud. From the Blackberry device identified as having originated in the UK
office of a Japanese organisation, there was sufficient information/data
available to allow fraud to take place. The range and diversity of information
that was recovered would be sufficient for a fraudster to either manipulate the
information to advantage or to generate false documentation.
In the case of the hand held devices that had come from commercial
organisations, there is an issue of the duty of care that they with regard to data
that relates to the business and also the individual that had used the device.
This is embodied in a range of legislation and standards, the most significant
being the Data Protection Act (1998) (DPA) and the requirements for corporate
governance that are expressed in regulations such as the Basel II accord or the
Sarbanes Oxley and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley legislation from the USA. The
relevance of the legislation from the USA is that the regulations apply to all
organisations that conduct business with organisations based in the USA. In the
UK under the DPA, any organisation that holds data from which an individual
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can be identified must, in addition to registering the fact that they hold such
data, also ensure that it is only used for the purpose for which it was obtained
and that the information is afforded a reasonable and appropriate level of
protection.
It is notable that the wording of the DPA that is used specifically requires that
information shall ‘not be disclosed’ and that is ‘shall be kept for no longer than
necessary’ in addition to the requirement for ‘appropriate security measures
shall be taken against unauthorised access to the data’. Clearly, from the fact
that this information ended up on hand held devices being offered for sale on
the second hand market, a number of organizations had failed to meet their
obligations with regard to this legislation.
In the cases of all the hand held devices that had originated from the
commercial sector, it would appear that the organisations have contravened the
Data Protection Act and have failed in their duty of care to the business and the
individuals. In the case of the two hand held devices that could be identified as
having originated from the financial services sector it is probable that they
have failed to satisfy one of a range of other items of legislation.
6. SUMMARY
It is clear from the results of the academic research that, in disposing of surplus
and obsolete hand held devices, many organisations have failed to recognise
their legal and statutory responsibilities and have not used good business sense.
Once an obsolete hand held device leaves the control of the organisation then,
if there is not a contract in place with a reputable organisation to ensure that the
devices are purged of data, and the process has not been carried out within the
organisation, the potential consequential loss of information is inevitable.
For the privately owned hand held device, it is not uncommon for them to be
kept for a period in the home and then eventually for them to be disposed of by
passing the on to a friend or relation, selling them on or donating them to
charity. It is clear from the research that the hand held device that were
examined that appeared to have come from private users contained a level of
information that, while it could be embarrassing, was not sufficient to be
damaging to their reputation or finances. However, this situation is likely to
change as 2.5 and 3G devices that potentially contain significantly more data
appear in greater numbers on the second hand market.
In summary, of the 161 hand held devices that were used during the research,
82 were not working or could not be accessed using the tools available. Of the
remaining 79, 37 of the hand held devices contained no user data and on 42
some data was present.
There is a clear difference in the quantity and the types of information that
were recovered from a 1G or a 2G mobile phone and that which can be
recovered from a Blackberry device. The research revealed that despite the

66

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 3(2)
availability of encryption as a set up option on the Blackberry device, four of
them (15%), had not had this security feature enabled.
This failure to take adequate steps to protect the data or to subsequently
remove it from the hand held devices has resulted in a number of these
organisations not meeting their statutory and legal obligations. It is clear that
the level of effort currently invested by an admittedly small, but still significant
number of organisations in ensuring that they have removed information from
hand held devices that are disposed of is totally inadequate.
7. RECOMMENDATIONS
A number of steps were identified by the research that could be implemented to
improve the protection of information stored on hand held devices. The main
steps are:


Education and awareness training for the users.



A system within the organisation for the secure disposal of mobile
devices.



The wider availability of tools and instructions for the removal of data
from hand held devices



A commitment from the organisations that accept donated hand held
devices to ensure that they are data cleansed before they are sold on.

None of these measures, in isolation will improve the level of risk and potential
exposure for the individual or an organisation. It is only when they are used in
combination that a significant change will occur.
8. CONCLUSIONS
While it is difficult to predict what will occur in the future with any certainty,
there is a strong probability that as 2.5G and 3G devices become more widely
used, the level of information that is stored on them will increase significantly
and the level of risk will more closely match that which currently exists for the
Blackberry devices. It is unlikely that 2.5G and 3G devices will gain the same
business market penetration, at least until the technologies and markets mature,
but they will still pose and information leakage threat for the individual.
CONTRIBUTING ORGANIZATIONS
British Telecommunications (BT). BT is one of the world's leading providers
of communications solutions serving customers in Europe, the Americas and
Asia Pacific. Its principal activities include networked IT services, local,
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Edith Cowan University (ECU). The Security and Intelligence research cluster
of the School of Computing and Information Science at ECU conducts research
into all aspects of Computer and Information Security from the technological
aspects of computer forensics and network security to the ‘softer’ side
involving issues such as perception management and information policy. At
present, its research theme is ‘deception’. The group has numerous doctoral,
masters and honours candidates. Its main areas of interest are information
operations, computer/network forensics, RFID security, mobile computing
security, honeypots and the use of deception in security.
University of Glamorgan (UoG). The Information Security Research Group
from the Faculty of Advanced Technology at the UoG has a strong and well
established theme in the areas of Computer forensics, Computer Network
Management and Computer Network Defence. The Information Security
Research Group is focused on the issues associated with the design and
development of early warning systems that are capable of detecting and
responding to a variety of cyber based attacks, and on the issues associated
with computer forensic science. The research is conducted mainly in the two
specialised laboratories of the group, the Network Security Laboratory and the
Computer Forensics Laboratory. The research feeds into the undergraduate and
postgraduate degree schemes in forensics and computer systems security
offered at the university.
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